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Ilhan Inan’s book The Philosophy of Curiosity is an exploration of un-
derstanding human curiosity and its relation to the use of language. He 
introduces the notion of inostensible reference (or reference to the un-
known) that renders an interesting question possible. He claims that our 
aptitude for this kind of reference is what enables us to become aware 
of our ignorance and be curious. For him, there are two ways in which 
a proposition could be inostensible to a subject: one possibility is when 
the whole sentence’s truth value is unknown to the subject, the other 
possibility is when the subject knows the proposition to be true but does 
not know the fact that makes the proposition true, which he later calls 
inostensible knowledge. The former case requires an awareness of igno-
rance to generate curiosity, and the latter case requires an awareness 
of inostensibility of one’s knowledge to be conducive to curiosity. In this 
paper, what I would like to do is mainly to draw attention to the often 
neglected awareness of inostensible knowledge and explore its relation to 
curiosity. I also claim that, contrary to Inan’s idea that the only way of 
having inostensible knowledge is when there is at least one inostensible 
concept in the proposition, there is another possibility of inostensible 
knowledge, which would correspond to a case in which all the terms are 
ostensible to the speaker and the proposition is known to be true, but the 
proposition as a whole is still inostensible. I would like to argue that 
such an awareness of inostensibility of knowledge is a key step in evalu-
ating one’s epistemic contact with reality and accordingly determining 
the degree of one’s knowledge on the epistemic scale. I believe this aware-
ness will implicitly raise the standard of knowledge and hopefully foster 
curiosity, in its broader meaning of caring to know. I will further suggest 
that the acquisition of ostensible knowledge, which is a form of objectual 
knowledge of a fact, could also enable the corresponding proposition to 
be known better by the subject. This claim of mine might be thought of 
as an attempt to argue for the gradability of propositional knowledge, 
which has been a controversial issue in epistemology.
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Introduction
It is no surprise to hear that curiosity propels discoveries, but one may 
also reasonably entertain the idea that discoveries could ignite curios-
ity. That would be a kind of curiosity not about the existence of the dis-
covered phenomenon, nor a curiosity regarding the truth value of the 
proposition that the discovery spells out. It would be a kind of curiosity 
about the fact, the piece of reality itself. For instance, “Alpha Centauri 
A is the star that is closest to our sun” is a piece of knowledge I might 
learn from a reliable astronomy book. Now, I can claim that I know 
that Alpha Centauri A is the star that is closest to our sun. Just after 
uttering this, it might sound peculiar when I say that I am curious to 
know that Alpha Centauri A is the star that is closest to our sun. Isn’t 
that suffi cient for me to claim that I know the fact of Alpha Centauri A 
being the closest star to our sun? I already know it, don’t I?1 I know the 
fact exists, but there is more to knowledge and it usually takes more 
to satisfy curiosity. Suppose that it is the fi rst time I hear the name of 
this star and the only thing I know of it is that it exists somewhere in 
space and is the closest one to our sun; in other words, I merely have 
knowledge of the truth of the aforementioned proposition. On the other 
hand, an astronomer possessing ample knowledge about the fact that 
makes this proposition true might know the same sentence. It seems 
there is a big difference between the epistemic state of the astronomer 
and that of mine concerning the knowledge of the proposition. We both 
“know that p” expressed by the sentence, yet, the two knowledge claims 
are not on a par. Propositional knowledge attributions do not discrimi-
nate between these two kinds of knowledge. This is the distinction Inan 
makes between “knowing that p” by merely knowing that there is a fact 
that makes the proposition true, what he calls inostensible knowledge, 
and “knowing that p” by knowing the fact, what he calls ostensible 
knowledge (Inan 2012: 52–53). In a theory of curiosity, this distinction 
becomes signifi cant as sometimes curiosity is more than a search for 
certainty. One may know a proposition, be certain that this proposition 
refers to a fact but one may still be curious to know the fact that makes 
it true. In such cases, rather than knowing that the sentence express-
ing it refers to a fact, the subject might be after increasing “the degree 
of ostensibility”, which is a notion that could be roughly described as 
how the curious subject is epistemically related to an object under a 
concept (Inan 2014).
1 Later, this will be characterized as a case of inostensible knowledge.
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1. Inostensible Knowledge
In order to make sense of these claims, it is crucial to understand the 
central concepts of ostensibility and inostensibility, which points to a 
novel distinction specifi ed by Inan. In spite of the fact that offering a 
complete account of the centrality of these terms in a theory of curios-
ity is diffi cult and it probably demands a rigorous study of Inan’s book, 
here it should suffi ce to offer a basic understanding of these concepts. 
Inostensibility is a term that fi rst appeared in Inan’s dissertation to 
single out a kind of reference in philosophy of language. He uses “in-
ostensible reference” almost as interchangeable with reference to the 
unknown, and in his book he argues that our aptitude for this kind of 
reference enables us to become aware of our ignorance and be curious. 
The following quote roughly defi nes what he has in mind while using 
this terminology:
The speaker may know what a term may refer to, in the sense that he knows 
that a certain object as being the referent of the term, and in the second case 
one may lack such knowledge. Let us call the fi rst kind of term relative to a 
speaker an “ostensible” term (for that speaker) and the latter an “inostensi-
ble” term (for that speaker). (Inan 2012: 33) 
To illustrate, suppose I want to inquire into the longest lived of men 
and since I do not know of any individual as being the longest lived of 
men, this makes the defi nite description “the longest lived of men” in-
ostensible to me. Yet, once I learn the referent of this term, it becomes 
ostensible, even though it could have a very low degree of ostensibility 
at the onset. By getting more acquainted with the object, the ostensi-
bility will increase. After introducing these concepts, Inan asserts that 
inostensible terms are always used in asking questions, and argues 
that every question asked out of curiosity involves the use of an inos-
tensible term.
As one would expect, ostensibility is a relational concept; so, wheth-
er a term is ostensible or inostensible for a person depends on that 
person’s epistemic link to the referent of that term. In other words, it 
is relative to the person and the same term may be ostensible for one 
and inostensible for another, and even for the same person a term that 
used to be inostensible in the past may later become ostensible upon 
gaining the required kind of knowledge. Then, what makes a proposi-
tion inostensible to someone? For Inan, there are two ways in which a 
true propostion can be inostensible for a subject, in the fi rst case the 
subject does not know whether the proposition is true, and in the other 
case the subject knows that the proposition is true, i.e., it refers to a 
fact, but the subject does not know the fact which makes the propo-
sition true. This latter case gives rise to “inostensible knowledge”, in 
which the subject merely knows that there is a fact, but does not have 
suffi cient experience of the fact so as to make it ostensible. On the other 
hand, one’s knowledge could be deemed “ostensible knowledge” if all 
the terms that are contained in the given proposition are ostensible to 
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the speaker; that is, if the speaker knows the referent of the terms in 
the proposition. Conversely, in inostensible knowledge cases, for Inan, 
there is at least one term in the sentence that is inostensible to the 
subject. He even claims that “the degree of ostensibility of a whole de-
clarative sentence is also a function of the degree of ostensibility of its 
constituent terms” (Inan 2014: 13), which comes to mean that if all 
the terms in a sentence are ostensible to a subject, the sentence is also 
ostensible. However, I would like to allow for another possible way of 
having inostensible knowledge, which is perhaps the least noticed one 
in inostensible knowledge cases. In this second case, one knows that 
the proposition expressed by the sentence is true, and one has ostensi-
ble knowledge of all the terms in a sentence, but the proposition as a 
whole is still inostensible to the subject. In other words, one knows that 
“a is F”, and both a and F are ostensible to the subject, but the knowl-
edge of the proposition as a whole is still inostensible.
Interestingly, the inostensibility of knowledge, especially if it is of 
the latter kind, mostly goes unnoticed. Contrary to the quite recogniz-
able awareness of inostensibility we have while asking a question as in 
“how many people shared the 2014 Nobel Peace Prize?”, by which we 
are attempting to transform our inostensible term “the number of the 
2014 Nobel Peace Prize winners” to an ostensible one by uttering this 
question, the inostensibility of propositional knowledge often escapes 
our notice. To illustrate, whenever I get the answer “two” to the ques-
tion “How many people shared the 2014 Nobel Peace Prize?”, I now can 
claim that I know “the number of the 2014 Nobel Peace Prize winners 
is two” even though I may not know anything about the winners. Sup-
pose someone else also utters the same sentence “the number of the 
2014 Nobel Peace Prize winners is two” while publishing an interview 
she conducted face-to-face with the winners. Here, whereas the fi rst 
subject merely has inostensible knowledge, the interviewer has osten-
sible knowledge of this proposition. Semantically, there is nothing to 
reveal this difference. This was a case of inostensible knowledge due to 
the inostensibility of the subject term for the speaker. Yet, for the cases 
in which the lack of ostensibility is regarding the knowledge of the fact 
the proposition as a whole refers to, it is even harder to recognize. That 
is to say, if it is a kind of inostensible knowledge in which all the terms 
are ostensible to the subject, and the subject further knows that the 
sentence is true, but the proposition as a whole still lacks ostensibility, 
this often goes unnoticed, and hence, it often fails to generate curios-
ity. For instance, one may think that the sentence “war is painful” is 
ostensible to a subject since both the concepts ‘war’ and ‘painful’ are os-
tensible for the subject and he or she knows the proposition to be true. 
But it might turn out that the fact the proposition as a unity refers to 
is not actually ostensible to the subject.
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2. Signifi cance of Awareneness 
of Inostensibile Knowledge
Now, I would like to focus on the signifi cance of the awareness of inos-
tensible propositional knowledge, and try to draw attention to how such 
an awareness might propel curiosity. I will begin by elaborating more 
on the neglect of the distinction between ostensible/inostensible knowl-
edge in epistemology and allude to one of the shortcomings in episte-
mology that Inan draws our attention; namely, the indeterminacy of 
“to know”. Despite its signifi cant consequences, this important distinc-
tion seems to be insuffi ciently addressed in philosophy literature. Inan 
says “knowing that a sentence refers to a fact does not imply that one 
thereby knows that fact; and if not, one may still be curious about it”. 
He argues that to satisfy our curiosity sometimes we need more than 
a proposition that we know to be true. Inan discusses this in his book 
making use of several intuitive examples and makes one wonder how 
such a signifi cant distinction could be overlooked in epistemology. One 
would expect it to be emphasized more and even be established as a 
central distinction; in other words, one would expect that we should 
be able to distinguish between having merely the knowledge of truth 
of the proposition versus having knowledge of the fact itself. These two 
epistemic states, i.e., having inostensible propositional knowledge ver-
sus ostensible propositional knowledge, point to an important distinc-
tion that reveals signifi cant epistemic intuitions.
Consider the following cases:
 i. S knows that the scent of the rose in the vase is pleasant.
 ii. S knows that the scent of Cosmos atrosanguineus is pleasant.
In the fi rst case, the subject smells the rose and knows that the scent of 
the rose is pleasant. In the second case, given that cosmos atrosanguin-
eus is an extinct fl ower that used to have a lovely fragrance, S can ac-
quire that knowledge from a reliable source and can claim to know this 
fact. Nonetheless, even though the two subjects both claim the same 
epistemic standing, i.e., “to know”, there is a striking difference be-
tween the two states. In case (i), S knows the fact that makes the propo-
sition true, whereas in case (ii), S merely knows that this proposition 
is —or used to be— true. This latter case is an instance of inostensible 
knowledge since the subject term of the sentence “the scent of Cosmos 
atrosanguineus” is inostensible to S. It is important to be aware of what 
S lacks in (ii), even if S can use the same verb “to know” in both cases. 
This nuance is generally neglected by epistemology literature and the 
lack of this awareness might display itself by a loss of curiosity on the 
part of the knower, as the subject might consider himself as “knowing” 
the fact the sentence refers to. In this particular case, it is practically 
impossible for S to know the proposition ostensibly as he cannot know 
the scent to which it actually refers. In other cases, it could be possible 
to gain more ostensibility regarding a fact. Yet, I think merely pos-
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sessing an awareness of the inostensibility of propositional knowledge 
attributions could be quite signifi cant, and even help us look at the 
world differently. Knowing that war is painful is true and knowing 
the fact that makes this proposition true are quite different epistemic 
standings, and the latter is defi nitely more profound. Unfortunately, 
epistemology literature has been mostly insensitive to that subtlety.
Although one of the most original and important contributions of 
Inan’s book is the claim that there is “inostensible propositional knowl-
edge”, awareness of inostensibility of propositional knowledge, which 
is so ubiquitous in the book, is not mentioned at all. I think drawing 
attention to this awareness is signifi cant and plays quite an important 
role in a theory of curiosity, since a considerable part of our curiosities 
linger even if we have propositional knowledge, and knowing the truth 
or falsity of a proposition may not be what a curious person aims for in 
the end.
As normative a claim as it might be, this distinction of ostensibil-
ity and inostensibility, coupled with the awareness of such a distinc-
tion lets us appreciate there is more to knowledge; in a sense, it is an 
awareness that to know is deeper than knowing the truth of a proposi-
tion. This kind of awareness will be related to the value of knowledge 
that transcends certainty or truth. In a sense, it is about knowledge of 
“something” other than truth. Knowledge can get deeper, get better or 
get enriched without necessarily having anything to do with knowing 
more about its truth or having a stronger justifi cation, this could hap-
pen due to experiencing, internalizing the piece of knowledge and mak-
ing it one’s own. Take the proposition “Love is beautiful”, one can grasp 
this proposition and may merely know that this proposition is true, 
one can understand what this proposition might come to mean through 
reading a touching romance; one can also further experience love, get 
acquainted with the fact and come to know that the proposition “love is 
beautiful” means something much deeper than one originally thought. 
In the fi rst case, the subject merely knows that this proposition is true 
but does not really know the fact the it refers to, in the second case, the 
subject has somewhat better knowledge, yet experiencing the beauty 
of love can enable one to know the proposition “love is beautiful” even 
much better. However, this still would not be the last step in the epis-
temic journey, for one could experience love once more in one’s life and 
might realize that if this experience is love the former was indeed less 
than love.
Peculiar as it might sound, one suggestion could be to adopt the use 
of “testify” rather than “know” whenever one merely has inostensible 
propositional knowledge. In other words, at the entrance of the stair-
way to knowledge, one should perhaps be aware that one is not entitled 
to say one “knows” the proposition yet, or else one could at least realize 
that “to know” is gradable and it is possible to increase the quality of 
his knowledge. So, the use of “testify” should be seen as an attempt to 
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raise the standard of knowledge rather than a vain effort to change 
language. Accordingly, if I were lucky enough to have ostensible knowl-
edge of the beauty of love, this would stipulate me to say “I know that 
love is beautiful”; however, being lucky enough not to have experienced 
the painfulness of war in my life so far, I should perhaps say that “I 
testify that war is painful” rather than “I know that war is painful”.
Restricting the use of “to know” might seem as a fi ne grained is-
sue that has little signifi cance as long as we can communicate what 
we mean. But I have worries about the possibility of losing a sense 
of wonder and curiosity due to the pretense of “knowledge that we do 
not yet deserve”. In philosophical terms, having de dicto satisfaction2 
of our curiosity sometimes stops us from inquiring further, and inos-
tensible propositional knowledge passes as knowledge, in spite of the 
fact that it is just the entrance to the stairway to knowledge. Having 
ostensible knowledge—although it is not always possible practically or 
metaphysically—should perhaps be the ideal to strive for. This could be 
achieved through the act of distancing ourselves from the proposition 
and sincerely asking if we know what it really means —or might come 
to mean. By fostering the awareness of inostensibility of propositional 
knowledge, one would also nurture curiosity in one’s life, as this aware-
ness will manifest itself in inquiring more into what we thought we 
knew, and in a sense what we certainly, yet inostensibly, knew.
3. A Threefold Awareness Regarding Inostensibility
An important insight that emerges from recognizing this distinc-
tion between ostensible and inostensible knowledge in propositional 
knowledge attributions is that it makes possible to talk about degrees 
on a scale of epistemic strength/intensity. On the condition that the 
epistemic scale is thought like a stairway, inostensible propositional 
knowledge (IPK) will be taken as merely the entrance to the stairway to 
knowledge, which will open the door for the individual to be aware of 
the lack of ostensibility of his knowledge and this awareness will pave 
the way for further curiosity.
At this point, I would like to sketch out three possible cases of aware-
ness of inostensibility regarding a proposition and how they could be-
come conducive to curiosity:
 In case (a), S does not know whether the proposition expressed 
by the sentence is true,
 in case (b), S does not ostensibly know one of the terms in a sen-
tence that he thinks he knows,
 and in case (c), the proposition expressed by the sentence is inos-
tensibile for S even if S knows the proposition to be true and all 
the terms are ostensible to S.
2 See Inan (2012, especially Chapters 5 and 9) for the distinction between de re 
versus de dicto satisfaction of curiosity.
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In fact, pondering on the status of a proposition with respect to its epis-
temic link to the knower reveals some interesting intuitions, the most 
neglected of which is the awareness of inostensibility characterized in 
(c). Now, I will try to demonstrate what I call a threefold awareness 
regarding inostensibility; to do this, I will make use of three different 
cases of epistemic connection to propositions and each corresponding 
sentence will be used to elaborate more on the type of awareness.
 Example for the case (a) S: There are extraterrestrial beings in 
outer space.
 Example for the case (b) S: The roses in my friend’s garden 
smell good.
 Example for the case (c) S: War is painful.
In the example for case (a), S does not know whether the proposition is 
true and this is an opportunity to gain awareness of ignorance.
This sentence is inostensible to S because the truth value of the 
whole sentence is unknown to S, as S is not acquainted with the fact 
that makes this proposition either true or false. In the fi rst sentence, 
the proposition, whether or not there are extraterrestrial beings in out-
er space, is so inostensible to S that S does not even know if it refers to 
a fact, let alone ostensibly know anything about the fact itself, and S is 
aware that he is still in the dark about it. This darkness often causes 
one to realize one's lack of epistemic contact with the fact and thereby 
one demands enlightenment. Since awareness of lacking knowledge, 
given that we are interested enough in the subject, usually causes cu-
riosity, it is expected that the subject will get curious. Hence, there is 
a natural and easily detectable link between awareness of ignorance 
and curiosity.
In the example for the case (b), S knows the sentence to be true, but 
lacks ostensible knowledge of the subject term in the sentence, this is 
an opportunity S to gain awareness of inostensibility of his knowledge 
due to the inostensibility of the subject term.
Suppose S talks to a friend about gardening and wants to plant fra-
grant roses on his front porch. His friend tells him that the roses in his 
garden smell good and he might consider planting that type, which is 
called Francis Meilland. S believes his friend and now he can say that 
he knows the roses in his friend’s garden, i.e. Francis Meilland roses, 
smell good. This is a case of inostensible knowledge because he has not 
seen the roses in his friend’s garden nor has he experienced the smell. 
He merely knows that this proposition refers to a fact without knowing 
the fact to which it refers. He must stop and smell the roses to make 
his knowledge ostensible.
In the example for the case (c), S knows the proposition to be true, 
both terms are ostensible to him, but S lacks inostensibility of the 
proposition as a whole, and this is an opportunity to gain awareness of 
inostensibility of his knowledge of the proposition as a unity.
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This awareness draws attention to a mostly unrecognized yet im-
portant distinction that affl icts many of our knowledge claims. Since all 
the terms in the sentence “war is painful” are ostensible to S, and the 
truth value of the proposition is not a mystery, and in a sense is too ob-
vious, S might confi dently, yet mistakenly, think that he is already at 
top of the epistemic scale regarding his knowledge of the given proposi-
tion. However, pondering on the ostensible/inostensible distinction will 
enable S to question the status of the proposition for him as a unity; 
and this might motivate him to deepen his knowledge. This could be 
thought as a call for increasing the degree of ostensibility of the propo-
sition as a whole. Let us suppose S is a history professor and he knows 
a lot about wars in the human history and this concept is ostensible 
to him, he also knows very well that “war is painful” is true. Further 
suppose that he is familiar with pain due to his having lost a loved 
one recently, so he sadly knows what painful refers to. Even though 
the terms war and painful are ostensible to him, there is a sense in 
which he does not have ostensible knowledge of the proposition “war is 
painful”. Conversely, a person who has experienced war and has gone 
through the painfulness of it would have ostensible knowledge of this 
fact and would know the proposition better. Yet, this should not be un-
derstood as requiring one to experience the painfulness of war, or any 
such experience, to know the propositions ostensibly. For instance, if 
one has not experienced humiliation before, it would not be logical to 
advise that person to be humiliated to understand the proposition “be-
ing humiliated is bad”. There are other ways to make one’s knowledge 
more ostensible, such as through empathy, getting more acquainted 
with the fact by observing others who experience it, as well as through 
other possible ways of gaining partial ostensibility. Regardless of the 
attainability of ostensibility or of possible means to attain it, I would 
like to make a more philosophically salient point here, which is a call 
for distancing oneself from the proposition and the concepts involved in 
the proposition and sincerely ask oneself if he really knows the fact the 
proposition refers to, and aim to imagine to what the fact might actu-
ally refer. Only then, can one determine how ostensible the knowledge 
at hand is for oneself. This awareness will be vital in acknowledging 
how deeply/fully/well one knows, or possibly utterly fails to know the 
proposition. Hopefully, it could also enable one to get curious to know 
the inostensible propositions more deeply. But, what kind of deeper 
knowledge would that be? It would not be about the truth of the propo-
sition, as propositional knowledge already provides this to the subject. 
It has to be about something other than truth; it could perhaps be a 
transformative epistemic leap through experience, which causes one to 
gain better insight into the fact.
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4. Knowing a Proposition Better 
Through Having Better Ostensibility of a Fact
Idiosyncratic though it may seem considering the mainstream episte-
mology literature, I would like to argue that it is possible to know more 
about a proposition without having anything more to do with knowing 
about its truth. In other words, it is possible to know more about a fact 
regarding something other than its truth. It is especially the case when-
ever the piece of knowledge at hand is of something to be experienced. 
I agree that it is not intuitive to think I may know the proposition 
“the age of my physics professor is 43” better or more deeply. This is a 
simple factual knowledge and when I hear that this proposition is true, 
it automatically becomes ostensible to me assuming that I am familiar 
with my physics professor and what it is to be 43, which simply means 
having lived in this world for 43 years.
However, for propositions that allow for better understanding it is 
possible to have partial ostensibility, which would be usually the case 
in experiential knowledge. In fact, it may even be the case that a full os-
tensibility is sometimes unattainable for some propositions, as “better 
knowledge” of them always remains possible. In light of this, I will ar-
gue that gaining partial ostensibility of the fact in cases of experiential 
knowledge enables one to know the proposition better. To illustrate, ex-
periencing the beauty of love through watching a well-made romantic 
movie may give partial ostensibility of the fact of “the beauty of love”, 
but experiencing it in one’s own life might make one know the fact bet-
ter and accordingly make one know the proposition that “love is beauti-
ful” better. Similarly, experiencing the joy of being a mother makes one 
know the proposition that “becoming a mother is joyous” better. Yet, 
someone might get close to having better knowledge of this proposition 
by watching the joy of her best friend becoming a mother. Furthermore, 
I also would like to allow for the possibility of gaining partial ostensibil-
ity regarding an experiential knowledge not through direct experience 
but via other means such as fostering emphatic abilities in general. 
I may get better knowledge that “war is painful” not because I feel 
pain (get acquainted with pain) or experience war (get acquainted with 
war), but because I gain better emphatic abilities (due to becoming a 
mother/father, or reading about empathy in general) and so know that 
“war is painful” more fully. Even watching a movie or a documentary 
might help me make the fact of “war’s being painful” more ostensible 
to me. So, I might claim that I know the proposition better now since I 
ostensibly know what it might refer to as a fact.
With reference to all that has been said above, I would like to claim 
that by gaining ostensible knowledge of the fact, one also gains better 
knowledge of the proposition itself. In other words, knowing the ref-
erent—or if I may say, knowing ostensibly—enables one to know the 
proposition better, in the sense of increasing one’s acquaintance with 
the proposition. This could be thought as a claim for the possibility of 
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the gradability of propositional knowledge, and indirectly as a call for 
raising the standard of knowledge.
Yet, one might oppose this intuition and claim that rather than be-
ing a case of having better propositional knowledge, the above example 
would be better interpreted as a case arising out of increasing one’s ob-
jectual knowledge. In other words, the opponent may claim that the in-
ostensibility of the proposition is due to the lack of objectual knowledge 
of war and/or painfulness, and the more one attains objectual knowl-
edge of those, the more ostensible the proposition will be. However, my 
claim is somewhat bolder than that, and extends to knowing better the 
proposition as a whole. I want to claim that what the subject lacks is 
not an objectual knowledge of war or painfulness, but the ostensible 
knowledge of the fact of “war’s being painful”. Since this is a kind of 
knowledge that can only be fully known through experience, there is 
something seriously missing in S’s knowledge claim, even though S has 
non-experiential propositional knowledge. To put it slightly differently, 
one who has experienced the painfulness of war can be said to know 
“war is painful” better than S does. 
Such an understanding of knowledge as something gradable is less 
controversial in cases of objectual knowledge, but gradability is almost 
never applied to propositional knowledge cases in mainstream episte-
mology literature. Yet, I think “knowing better” does not necessarily 
have to be “of an object”, it could as well be “of a proposition”. It would 
be overambitious to try to establish this view here, but I just want to 
note that this intuitive view is hinted at by a scant number of episte-
mologists.3 One of the most outspoken proponents, Stephen Hethering-
ton, attacks what he thinks are two “dogmas” of epistemology. One of 
them he calls “epistemic absolutism” which amounts to the claim that 
knowledge is absolute: you can be with or without it, but once you have 
it, it is not possible to have more or less. Sharing perhaps a similar 
intuition, Bac holds that empirical knowledge is a matter of degree 
(Bac 1999), and revisiting a similar characterization of knowledge, in a 
recent article, Bac and Irmak argue that we should rethink about what 
and how we know in general and whether knowledge is really an on/off 
switch which has no gradation or nuance (Bac 2011: 319). Some others 
such as Lawrance BonJour fi nd that without allowing for such grada-
tion, knowledge talk becomes useless and he even resorts to discarding 
the concept of knowledge: “The concept of knowledge is… a seriously 
problematic concept… So much so that it is… best avoided as far as 
possible in sober epistemological discussion.” (BonJour 2010).
Related to this, recent epistemological discussions have seen a surge 
of interest in the notion of understanding as opposed to knowledge, and 
there have been attempts to shift the epistemological focus from knowl-
3 Stephen Hetherington is one such epistemologist who offers a sophisticated 
theory of (empirical) knowledge by allowing for fi ne-grained evaluations of competing 
knowledge-claims (see Hetherington 2001, 2005).
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edge to understanding. This has been mainly due to the problems en-
countered when searching for an intrinsic or distinctive value that can 
be attributed to knowledge (see especially Kvanvig 1998, 2003, Depaul 
1989, Zagzebski 1996, 2003, Boylu 2010, Jones 2003 and Riggs 2002). 
Understanding, which is a concept that allows for gradability, has been 
appealing for virtue epistemologists who has concerns about refl ecting 
the true nature of our knowledge claims. In her article, Boylu reason-
ably claims that “there is always a minimal understanding required by 
knowledge but one can understand better what one already knows.” 
(Boylu 2010: 598). Hence, the idea of gradation is perhaps inevitable 
in knowledge talk.
For me, increasing the ostensibility of one’s knowledge of a fact 
through experience makes the knowledge a better one compared to the 
non-experiential—albeit perhaps certain—knowledge one had before, 
and it adds further value to the knowledge at hand. Perhaps the idea 
that the value of experiential knowledge exceeds that of non-experi-
ential knowledge is one of the insights that goes as far back as Plato’s 
Meno. Knowing the way to Larissa is possibly a case of experiential 
knowledge, and having only factual knowledge rather than having 
experiential knowledge puts one on a comparatively worse epistemic 
standing. As Socrates says, “if a man knew the way to Larissa, or any 
other place you please, and walked there and led others, would he not 
give right and good guidance?” For Plato, he defi nitely would. Analo-
gously, one who has experiential knowledge of a proposition would defi -
nitely be in a better epistemic standing.
 To make sense of this distinctive value of experiential knowledge, 
it is perhaps useful to refl ect on cases which can only be fully known 
through experience. Let us consider the following propositions:
 War is painful.
 A day spent in Disneyland is fun.
Assuming that the sentences above are true, I want to claim that it 
is possible to know these propositions better, more fully or ostensibly 
by coming to know what facts they actually —or possibly— refer to. 
In addition, knowing the facts more ostensibly enables one to have 
better propositional knowledge of such experiential knowledge cases. 
Thus, this allows me, contra Stanley (2005: 40), to argue that the fol-
lowing would be uncontroversial examples involving scales of epistemic 
strength or depth.
(a) A Syrian boy knows that war is painful better than a Swiss boy 
does.
(b) A Syrian boy knows that war is painful better than he knows 
that a day spent in Disneyland is fun.
Unlike the common assumption of lack of gradability for propositional 
knowledge, propositional knowledge cases that require experience to 
be fully known seems to be gradable. That is, the knowledge of some 
facts may become more ostensible, hence known better, by gaining 
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deeper knowledge of the facts they refer to. One might merely grasp 
the proposition “war is painful” and might know that proposition refers 
to a fact, which would merely be a case of inostensible knowledge. On 
the other hand, another person who gains ostensible knowledge of this 
proposition through experience may be said to know the proposition 
better. Just as better knowledge could be due to better acquaintance 
with the objects in the proposition, it is also possible through getting 
acquainted with the proposition as a whole. That is to say, getting more 
acquainted with war or pain or Disneyland or having fun might help 
you know the proposition better. This would be an attempt to make 
sense of this betterment of knowledge by appealing to increasing ob-
jectual knowledge of things while keeping propositional knowledge as 
it is, sans gradation. Yet, what I wish to claim is beyond that; I would 
like to entertain the idea that knowing a proposition more deeply could 
also be possible, which results from knowing the fact more ostensibly.
My reasoning will possibly become more obvious, once we get rid of 
the “know that p” formulation. I suppose it would be permissible to form 
the sentence “I know that war is painful” with this different formula-
tion without losing the meaning: “I know war’s being painful”. This 
particular sentential form, which is the standard form used in Turkish 
for propositional knowledge attributions, perhaps reveals more accu-
rate intuitions. To make it more explicit, let us consider Turkish lan-
guage and the sentential form for propositional knowledge cases. The 
standard form of propositional knowledge in the Turkish language can 
be formulated word by word as “war’s painfulness I know”.4 It is also 
possible to use the formulation “I know that war is painful” in Turkish,5 
but even though grammatically correct, it is rarely used, and when it 
is used, it usually adds a poetic touch to the statement. That is to say, 
in Turkish language, instead of the “S knows that x is y” structure, a 
sentence almost always has the form “S knows x’s being y”. The latter 
sentential form, which is the way Turkish people say that they know a 
particular proposition to be true, has a structure similar to that of ob-
jectual knowledge attributions. It seems that gradability becomes less 
problematic when the proposition to be known is formed as such; in 
other words, just as one could know an object better, it would be less 
controversial to claim that one could know “war’s being painful” better. 
Granted that gradability is possible for propositional knowledge, 
one may meaningfully say, “I know that war is painful better now” af-
ter experiencing the painfulness of war. So, my claim is that by making 
a fact more ostensible, one also comes to know the proposition better. 
Since, as argued above, it seems possible to get acquainted with propo-
sitional content just as it is possible to get acquainted with an object, it 
could be claimed that better knowledge is not restricted to things but is 
also applicable to propositions.
4 In Turkish, the sentence would be “Savaşın acı olduğunu biliyorum”.
5 In Turkish, the sentence would be “Biliyorum ki savaş acıdır”.
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5. Degrees of Ostensibility 
and Degrees of Propositional Knowledge
After making this claim, I want to relate all these insights to my main 
endeavor, which could be thought of as an attempt to motivate curiosi-
ty by fostering an awareness of possible degrees of ostensibility regard-
ing our propositional knowledge claims. Acknowledging the fact that 
propositional knowledge admits of gradability makes one understand 
that having inostensible propositional knowledge—knowing the truth 
of a fact without knowing the fact itself—is not the end but perhaps 
the beginning of our epistemic journey. The destination would be full 
ostensibility, which is an ideal a curious mind should strive for. It is an 
ideal because precious things are as diffi cult as they are rare:6
Inostensible knowledge is abundant, but ostensible knowledge is scarce. 
This usually gets unnoticed. If knowledge is valuable, then surely ostensible 
knowledge should be taken to be more valuable than inostensible knowl-
edge. There are many things people claim to know, and perhaps mostly they 
are right about it; but we forget the fact that in most cases when someone 
is said to know something that is of some signifi cance, they have very little 
experience of the subject matter of whatever it is that they know… (Inan, 
Forthcoming)
The awareness that in most cases our knowledge is in fact inosten-
sible proves to be signifi cant, because whenever we realize that our 
knowledge attributions fall short of being ostensible, it propels us to 
strive to deepen our knowledge. This awareness could also enable one 
to appreciate the value of ostensible knowledge, which far exceeds the 
value of knowledge of truths. Taking ostensibility out of the picture, 
there remains almost nothing but knowledge of truths. Furthermore, 
when this passes as knowledge, this causes knowledge to be under-
rated, while knowledge of truths become overrated. My hope is that the 
awareness of inostensibility of propositional knowledge, and the pos-
sibility of knowing something more fully, deeply, completely, if I may 
say, ostensibly, would be valued more as a result of such an awareness. 
Only then can one meaningfully utter sentences like:
 I know that love is beautiful but I can know it more deeply.
 I know that love is beautiful but there is more to experience to 
know it fully.
 I know that love is beautiful but some truths allow for deeper 
understanding.
 I know that love is beautiful but it is not all that can be known 
about p.
 I know that love is beautiful, but it is inostensible propositional 
knowledge, and I can make it more ostensible.
Notice that, the fi rst parts of the sentences above, which could be for-
mulated as “I know that p” are so strong and perhaps possess an un-
6 Alluding to Spinoza’s famous saying.
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deserved epistemic standing with which we credit ourselves. It easily 
misleads us into being dogmatic if we are not aware of our fallibility 
and not attentive to the inostensibility of our knowledge. It is interest-
ing that knowing the truth of a proposition, which we express with “I 
know that p” is like knowing the name of a thing; it gives us the illusion 
of knowing the fact.
6. To Name or Not to Name: The Guise of Ostensibility
Lastly, I would like to elaborate on the guise of knowing associated with 
giving standard names to things. This is addressed in Inan’s book but 
while his treatment is mainly about proper names and general terms, I 
will extend this problem to apply to knowing the name of feeling terms 
and the truth value of propositions (Inan 2012: 145). Inan thinks that 
“many proper names we use daily, of great fi gures, cities, or planets, 
are in fact inostensible for us, which we tend to forget” (Inan 2012: 63). 
Then, he goes on to say that:
I know that the closest star to our sun is Alpha Centurie, but that’s about 
all that I know about this star. If someone were to ask me what the closest 
star to our sun is, I would normally answer by “Alpha Centurie”; the reason 
for this is that normally I would take the question to be asking for a name, 
although the interrogative used does not really ask for a name but a star. 
If the name “Alpha Centurie” is in fact inostensible for me, given my lack 
of knowledge of it, then I really should have said that I do not know the 
answer to the question.
It is evident that knowing the name of a thing (also applicable to know-
ing the truth of a proposition) gives us the impression that we know 
the answer. This impression, in turn, causes us to stop inquiring fur-
ther/deeper into the phenomenon. Perhaps the person in the example 
above had better replied “it is a star called Alpha Centauri” rather than 
claiming to know which star it is. In the case of general terms, Inan 
holds that we also feel a “false sense of acquaintance” even if we do not 
exactly know what we refer to. In turn, this causes a lack of awareness 
of our unfamiliarity with these terms.
We use general terms in everyday speech having extremely little knowledge 
of their referents. We talk about different kinds of animals, herbs, atomic 
parts, or what have you, not really knowing them. Given that such knowl-
edge is available and in our reach, we feel at home. The more frequently 
such terms are used, the more a false sense of acquaintance with their refer-
ents emerges. Just because someone uses the term “rye” in his everyday af-
fairs regularly, to buy bread for instance, it does not follow that this person 
knows the kind of cereal it refers to. (Inan 2012: 145)
I would like to extend such a sense of false acquaintance to terms we 
use in language that we have not experienced as a fact but roughly 
know what they refer to. If one refl ects on his epistemic status regard-
ing his understanding of such terms like painfulness of war, joy of be-
ing a mother, losing a loved one, beauty of love, etc. one might come 
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to the realization that he is not acquainted with them since these are 
not fully known prior to experience. Furthermore, knowing a proposi-
tion that could only be known fully through experience to be true also 
causes one to misinterpret one’s epistemic relation to the given proposi-
tion. For instance, knowing that “losing a loved one is bad” to be true 
might cause one to take this piece of knowledge for granted if one is not 
refl ective enough on the epistemic status of this proposition in relation 
to oneself.
Now, to appreciate the role of experience in knowledge attributui-
ons, let us consider two cases:
 The sky is blue. (Mary in the black-and-white room)7
 War is painful. (Someone who has not experienced war)
Or, assuming that speakers have never experienced war or the color 
blue, these two sentences would be better formed as:
 The sky is said to be blue.
 War is said to be painful.
In the fi rst case, Jackson’s Mary has no qualms whatsoever about the 
truth of this piece of knowledge. She in fact knows this—inostensibly 
though—better than many other people as she is taught quite a great 
deal about color science including how and where they are refl ected on 
earth. Yet, there is a sense in which she lacks knowledge of sky’s being 
blue. She only knows that the sky is said to be blue. She does not know 
what blue is like. Not getting out of her black and white room all her 
life, she has not experienced the color blue and there is a lack of osten-
sibility in her knowledge claim. She does not have all there is to know 
the fact that “the sky is blue” and whenever she is allowed to leave the 
room and look up at the sky, can she be said to know the proposition 
that “the sky is blue” ostensibly. Likewise, in the second case, a person 
who has not experienced war would not know what feeling corresponds 
to “war’s being painful”, even if these terms are ostensible to him. Since 
this wording might arouse a sense of false familiarity, let us come up 
with a new concept such as ‘awefullypainful’8 and let us assume it is 
a concept used only to refer to the feeling one has experiencing war. 
Let us also suppose that it is an easily graspable concept for speakers 
of English. Then, I may, without contradicting myself, say that I do 
not fully know war’s being awefullypainful. I just know that “war is 
awefullypainful” is said to be true. Only if we take knowledge as saying 
nothing more than knowledge of truth of a proposition, then can I say 
that I know that war is awefullypainful.9 Prior to knowing it ostensibly, 
7 The thought experiment was originally proposed by Jackson (1982, 1986).
8 I made up that word from the word pain and ‘awe’ which etymologically 
comes from the Greek word ‘achos’ meaning grief, pain, woe. Also alluding to the 
connotations of fear, terror, and dread. Notice that it is purposefully written as 
“awefullypainful”, rather than “awfullypainful”.
9 Perhaps it will be helpful to draw an analogy to Mary uttering the sentence ‘I 
know that the sky is blue’ prior to her experience of the blue sky.
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if one asks me what feeling is awefullypainful, the only thing I could 
say is that it is the feeling one experiences in war. Similarly, suppose 
Mary goes outside and looks up at the blue sky, now she knows sky’s 
being blue. Does she know the proposition better now? If we admit that 
ostensibly knowing is better, she seems to know the proposition “the 
sky is blue” better now. Yet, if we think of knowing a proposition as 
merely expressing a justifi ed true belief of the subject, then nothing 
has changed for Mary, the proposition is still as true and as justifi ed 
as it was prior to the experience. But there is a sense in which Mary 
knows “the sky is blue better after she sees the blue sky. This is a 
better knowledge of something other than truth, a kind of knowledge 
which requires experience, and the standard defi nition of propositional 
knowledge is inattentive to this.
Similarly, only after I experience war, can I be said to know how 
awefullypainful war is. A person who has experienced the painfulness 
of war might say, for instance, “I know how one feels in war, but I forgot 
what it is called”, or perhaps there is no separate word for it in her lan-
guage—just as the English language has none—and since naming is not 
knowing, it should not be about what it is called.10 In the same manner, 
Mary may forget the name of the color, i.e. blue, after she sees the sky, 
but then she will still surely know the blueness of the sky itself. And 
just like Mary can say “I know the color of the sky but I forgot its name” 
without contradicting herself, another person can say “I know how war 
feels but I forgot what it is called”. It is clear that to know a colour does 
not require one to know its standard name. Similarly, “awefullypainful” 
is still ostensible for one, even one she forgets or has never learned that 
it is called awefullypainful. This could be captured by the distinction 
between knowing a concept versus knowing the name of a concept; a 
similar distinction could be made between knowing a fact versus know-
ing the truth of a proposition, that is, whether or not the proposition 
refers to a fact. Ostensibly knowing that war is awefullypainful and 
inostensibly knowing that war is awefullypainful would be examples of 
the latter distinction above, respectively.
One important aspect to consider here would be the role of experi-
ence in making these distinctions. In Mary case, it is clear that to know 
blue and to know the name of the color blue are two different things. 
One is knowing the color itself, the other is just knowing the correct 
reference. ‘Blue’ is a word, but blue is a color, something to experience; 
‘awefullypainful’ is a concept but awefullypainful is the feeling which 
is not fully knowable prior to experience. It would also be not wrong 
to claim that if one is satisfi ed by the name ‘blue’ when one inquiries 
into the color of the sky, then, instead of “what is the colour of sky?” 
one actually wants to ask “what is the name of the colour of the sky?” 
10 This point is made in Inan’s book to establish the idea that “knowing the 
standard name of an object is neither necessary nor suffi cient to come to know that 
object” (Inan 2012: 139).
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In the same manner, if one is satisfi ed by the answer “war is aweful-
lypainful”, in other words, by the knowledge of truth of the fact that 
war is awefullypainful, then, instead of asking what does war feel like, 
in other words, knowing about the awefullypainfulness of war, one per-
haps wants to ask “what is the name of the feeling you get in war?” 
One is a superfi cial thing compared to the other. Naming things is a 
habit that has many pragmatic advantages but it also deceives us into 
thinking that we have knowledge when we have only the knowledge of 
the name of a concept or only the knowledge of truth of the proposition. 
Inan shares his worry as such:
There is nothing in the semantic content of the sentence that reveals this 
difference though. So the distinction between ostensible and inostensible 
knowledge cannot be cashed out in terms of the kind of proposition that 
is known. Contemporary epistemology, which predominantly focuses on 
propositional knowledge, is unable to mark this important difference. (Inan 
2012: 68)
But why should we care about this distinction?
First, it is about raising the standard of knowing. An awareness 
of the inostensibility of knowledge will allow people to demand more, 
and aim at ostensibility. Through aiming at ostensible knowledge, one 
also aims at better knowledge, hence it becomes possible and meaning-
ful to talk about better/deeper knowledge. Then, no one in their right 
mind would claim that they know things so effortlessly. Of course, they 
would know the truth of the fact, but that would be it. As noted earlier, 
for cases in which we fi nd ourselves quite far from ostensibility, rather 
than saying “I know that x is F”, I would rather we said, “I testify that 
x is F”. For, “to know” is deeper.
We may perhaps liken “naming” to creating an epistemic mental fi le 
of things—a mental fi le that needs to be rich enough for some, while 
others may be happy with merely naming the fi le. But whenever people 
become aware of the scantiness of their fi les—that is, become aware 
of the inostensibility of their knowledge—this will make them realize 
that they do not have the right to claim they know it fully and this 
awareness will hopefully propel them to demand more and be curious. 
It is important to note that, the person longing for ostensibility will 
not be after complete certainty (as the naming of the fi le is correct), 
but perhaps after complete understanding. There is a certain epistemic 
humility about the fact that he may come to know that “x is F” better 
through experiencing, internalizing, or refl ecting on the proposition at 
hand. It is a desire for enriching the fi le through seeing, tasting, smell-
ing, feeling, experiencing, etc. the fact the proposition refers to. Melo-
dramatic as it may sound, it could be summarized as a call for people 
“to stop and smell the roses” before saying that they know that roses do 
smell. Put more prosaically, the point is that ostensible knowledge, un-
like mere knowledge of truths, grants one internalized knowledge that 
is not easily lost, and it is this property that accounts for the distinctive 
value of ostensible knowledge over inostensible knowledge.
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Another important question is: no matter how we defi ne knowledge 
and no matter what our stance is on the gradability of knowledge, does 
knowledge of truths— that is, having IPK— satisfy curiosity? Should it 
be enough to satisfy curiosity? I think not. That would be like stopping 
at the entrance of the stairway to knowledge. That would be a cessation 
of curiosity way too early.
Secondly, I believe having ostensible knowledge of things might 
change the world for the better. Ostensibility is like ascending a stair-
way that is perhaps never-ending, and one had better aim as high 
as possible. This stairway starts with knowledge of truth (IPK) and 
it may gradually become less inostensible, but still more knowable. 
To illustrate with a few examples, romantic though it may seem, if 
people ostensibly knew or were aware of the lack of ostensibility of 
their knowledge that war is painful, they would be a lot more concerned 
about wars, what it really means to commence a war, and perhaps be 
more cautious to refrain from attitudes and acts that might give rise 
to war. Likewise, provided that people ostensibly knew what hunger 
is, then there would probably be less suffering from hunger. Deeper or 
better knowledge of propositions like “War is painful” or “This family 
is hungry” could possibly change the world; and even if having bet-
ter knowledge of those propositions may not be practically possible, at 
least being aware of the inostensibility of our knowledge is signifi cant. 
It helps us to empathize with people going through situations we have 
not experienced yet, and it enables one to care to know deeply. When 
one hears the sentence “hunger is bad”, that sentence will produce an 
effect depending on the experience one has had of that fact in one’s life. 
It is possible that there could be separate names for degrees of hunger; 
one word for being hungry for eight hours (which we normally take it 
to be), being hungry for a day, two days, a week, etc., then we would 
not so hastily claim that we know that “hunger is bad”. We would ques-
tion and care to know how others experience it. And this is not possible 
through a search for certainty that “hunger is bad”, but is possibly at-
tained by trying to increase the degree of ostensibility about the knowl-
edge that “hunger is bad”. One might state that “I know that hunger 
is bad”, but it could be just knowledge of its truth, that is, inostensible 
knowledge, supposing that one is medically not allowed to feel hunger 
and is instructed to eat every two hours due to a case of severe hypo-
glycemia. Another could know it more ostensibly, but to a lesser degree 
compared to someone who stays hungry for a day. So, it is possible to 
know better what a person means when one hears another utter the 
sentence “My family is hungry”.
I knew of an author once who never sated her hunger fully and did 
not turn on the heater in winter just to understand her fi ctional char-
acters better. Perhaps, we could do better to understand non-fi ctional 
characters, and perhaps, at least hope to recognize that ostensible 
knowledge requires one to move further along in the transformational 
epistemic journey. And no matter where one fi nds oneself situated on 
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the stairway to knowledge, I believe wisdom resides somewhere in the 
vicinity of awareness of inostensibility.
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